RECENT FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING STATE LAWS REGULATING FREIGHT AND PASSENGER RATES by MARTIN, GRANT G.
RECENT FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
RECENT FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AFFECT-
ING STATE LAWS REGULATING FREIGHT
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By Hon. Grant G. Martin, Attorney-General, State of Nebraska.
The trend of railroad management is to get away from state
regulations. The Federal Courts are inclined in that direction.
The effect of their late decisions is to bestow upon the general
government exclusive jurisdiction over all matters, affecting the
means, instruments, facilities and rates of transportation com-
panies conducting a business in more than one state. This system
would enable the general government to usurp control over local
traffic and rob the state of its inherent power to control and regu-
late its internal commerce and the means and instruments which
conduce to the same. So far as transportation companies oper-
ating in two or more states are concerned, they necessarily act in
a dual capacity and render a dual public service. They perform
a service originating and terminating within the state and also a
service of an interstate character.
Now the dual character of this public service requires a dual
system of regulation, the one subject to the state and the other
subject to the nation. While the general government is permitted
to reach within the limits of all the states and exercise regulating
powers to promote and protect commerce among the states,
numerous decisions have committed the Supreme Court of the
United States to the proposition that each state has the inherent
power to regulate all commerce within its limits of purely an in-
ternal character. The state has no right to invade the domain of
the Federal government, neither has the latter any right to invade
the domain of the state.
In this connection I shall refer to some provisions of the Federal
constitution and the early decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in relation thereto. I do this for the reason that
inferior court decisions are tending to Federal regulation rather
than state control of public carriers. Section 8, article I, of the
Federal constitution provides that Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states and with the Indian tribes.
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It does not say that Congress shall have power to regulate com-
merce in the several states, but among the several states. In dis-
cussing the phrase, "among the several states," Chief Justice
Mlarshall said:
"The completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be
considered as reserved for the state itself. The internal
commerce of a state, that is, the commerce which is wholly con-
fined within its limits, is as much under its control as foreign or
interstate commerce is under the control of the general govern-
ment."
Article 9, of Amendments to Constitution, provides that the
enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Article io, of Amendments to Constitution, provides that the
powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respective-
ly, or to the people.
Article ii, of Amendments to Constitution, provides that the
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state. The meaning of this amendment
is plain. The state of Georgia had been sued in the Supreme
Court of the United States by a citizen of another state. The
court entertained the action. This decision led to the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment, and its purpose was to prevent the
states from being sued by citizens of another state. The Eleventh
Amendment is no new thing; it was adopted in 1798.
Our own Nebraska court has held, in an opinion written by
Judge Sullivan:
"That the judicial power of the United States does not extend
to actions brought by individuals or corporations against a state.
The Eleventh Amendment to the federal constitution would be
effectually emasculated if it were permissible to enjoin or coerce
the agents through which a state performs its corporate func-
tions." (State v. C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 61 Neb. 545.)
Again, our Nebraska court held:
"The circuit court of the United States is without jurisdiction
to enjoin a state from the enforcement of its own laws ; that which
the federal court is without power to do directly it can not ac-
complish indirectly." (State v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co., 62 Neb. 123.)
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Wherever one, by virtue of his public position under the state
government, acts in the name and for the state, and is clothed
with her power, his act is her act. Ex parte Virginia, IOO U. S.
339.)
Seventy years ago the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the powers reserved to the several states extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern property
and the rights of property of individuals, as well as to the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the state. (King v. Amer-
ican Transportation Co., i Flipp (U. S.) I, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7,
787.) As late as the 123 U. S. report, the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
"The very object and purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was
to prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive
process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It
was thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that the sev-
eral states of the Union, invested with that large residuum of
sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States,
should be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of
private persons, whether citizens or aliens, or that the course of
their public policy and the administration of their public affairs
should be subject to and controlled by the mandates of judicial
tribunals without their consent, and in favor of individual inter-
ests." (In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 504, date 1887.)
In order to circumvent the purposes of this Eleventh Amend-
ment, public carriers have devised the scheme of having their
stockholders begin suit in the Federal Courts against the companies
themselves and the attorney-general of the state to enjoin the en-
forcement of state regulations. This in spirit is an action against
the state, because the attorney-general acts only in behalf of the
state. Under the state constitution and the laws of the state, he
is the law officer of the state. To prevent him from enforcing the
laws of the state affecting public carriers, is to stop all machinery
of the state government in relation thereto.
In recent years the Federal Courts have gradually broken away
from their original holdings referred to and are now committed
to the doctrine that a suit against the law officers of the state, who
are trying to enforce the laws of the state, is not a suit against
the state. These later decisions in effect abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment to the constitution.
Under these constructions the Eleventh Amendment serves no
useful purpose. The original theory of the Federal constitution
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was that state courts construe state laws in the first instance with
the right to review in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Under present holdings, many state enactments are enjoined by
Federal courts before they are considered by state courts. Thus,
the federal courts have become places of refuge for every man or
interest who sees fit to assail state enactments. It is true that the
federal courts hold that suits against state officers are not suits
against the state when such officers are seeking to enforce uncon-
stitutional laws, but this is answered by saying that a Federal court
ought to have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit at
the time the suit is commenced, and ought not to entertain a suit
upon the assumption that state officers are seeking to enforce un-
constitutional acts.
The decision in the Minnesota rate case is revolutionary in the
extreme. People who comprehend its far-reaching effect upon
the rights of the state are astounded. If Congress had brought
forth a measure which struck down the right of the states to
regulate their internal commerce, every state in the Union would
have been aroused.
This decision is revolutionary because it holds that the -Min-
nesota rate reductions, though applying only to commerce within
the state, interfere with interstate commerce, and, hence violate
the Federal constitution. For over one hundred years, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that the states had
exclusive. control over their internal commerce. During all that
time, practically all railroad regulation emanated from the states
and not from the general government.
"Rate-making is a legislative function," declares the author of
the opinion. What nonsense to say that rate-making is a legisla-
tive function, and then proceed as a court to declare every rate
so made void for one or all the reasons in the catalogue. What
rate fixed by a state legislature has been upheld by a federal
court? What is the-name of the judge of the Federal, District or
Circuit Court who has yet found a legislative-made rate which
he has seen fit to uphold? Judge McPherson held that the effect
of the Missouri law was to confiscate the property of the railroads.
Judge Vandevanter held the same, as to the law of Arkansas.
Judge Sanborn, sitting with others, held that the Oklahoma law
was taking railroad properties without just compensation, and
now reiterates the same thing with reference to the law of Minne-
sota.
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The facts are, these acts by the legislatures are being struck
down as fast as they reach the Federal judiciary. In very recent
years, rate reductions in North Dakota, South Dakota, Arkansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Minnesota have all met a similar fate.
These states constitute an empire in extent and contain a popula-
tion of over ten million people. Are these people ignorant, ma-
licious, or anarchistic? No, they are intelligent, fair-minded, and
patriotic as any people on earth. It is a condition and not a
theory that confronts them. These people know and have known
for a third of a century that they have been victimized by the
public carriers. They know that they have been, and now are,
even with the reduced rates in effect, the victims of still extor-
tionate freight rates as compared to adjoining states. These
people know, as do all the people of the country, that the rail-
roads have never prospered in their history like they have in the
last two years. Yet, in the face of this well known fact, every
legislative act designed to prevent extortionate rates has been
stricken down by the Federal courts on at least one of two grounds
-that it was either non-compensatory or confiscatory. This re-
sults from the adoption of an erroneous method of valuing rail-
road property and of apportioning operating expenses as between
state and interstate business.
I am informed that the railway commission of Minnesota spent
about $ioo,ooo in making a physical valuation of the railroad
properties. Every rail and every tie were taken into considera-
tion. The results of this valuation was presented to the referee
in the Minnesota cases in the form of evidence. What did he do
with it? He brushed it aside and took in its place the testimony
of real estate men, introduced by the companies, as to the value
of their terminal properties. These real estate men from Min-
neapolis and St. Paul fixed the values so high that any rate could
be proved confiscatory because it would not permit a return based
on such valuation. The Circuit Court adopted the findings of this
referee and declared him "a master learned in the law." I don't
call him that. I want this "master learned in the law" to state
the reason why he saw fit to reject the testimony offered by the
state based on a large expenditure of state funds in obtaining a
physical valuation of Minnesota railroads, and then adopt the tes-
timony of two real estate men brought forth by the railroad com-
panies, which I understand to be a fact. An explanation of why
it was necessary to reject the testimony of the state and adopt that
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of the companies on this point would be more helpful and in-
structive than a repetition of such generalities as the one which
reads, "That which is not supreme must yield to that which is
supreme." Is it any wonder that the Wall Street Journal declares
that this decision is "invaluable," which means, of course, that it
is exceedingly precious?
There is no doubt but that the testimony produced by the IMin-
nesota railroad commission was the fairest and most equitable,
concerning the value of railroad properties, which was introduced
before the referee who tried the case. This was acknowledged by
the greatest authority in America on the subject of railroad con-
struction and maintenance. I refer to Mr. Julius Kruttschnitt,
of Chicago. In testifying in the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway Company case, on July 12, 191o, which case is now
pending in the Federal Court of this state and involves the validity
of our two-cent passenger fare law and the freight rate reduction
law, which were passed by the legislature of 1907, this distin-
guished expert said:
"I have been making a study of this question of railroad valua-
tion for a number of years, and particularly in the last two years,
and I have obtained the reports of those state commissions that
have valued railroad properties and have studied them, and after
looking over all of them it seemed to me that the plan adopted by
the Minnesota State Commission was the fairest of any that has
been brought to my attention. The plan is contained in a circular,
as I remember it, of Mr. Dwight Morgan, who was the expert
employed by them to make the valuation, and it seemed to me to
be the most comprehensive, most logical, and fairest to both in-
terests of any that I know of. It seemed to me to be particularly
free from attack if used in defending railroad suits, because Mr.
Morgan was an employee of a state body and certainly could not
be accused by the public of prejudice or partisanship, and I have
found very few of his views, if any, that I could not pretty cor-
dially indorse and accept as my own."
These Federal Courts have in part adopted the revenue theory
for assigning the value of railroad property in a state to the
various classes of business and in apportioning operating ex-
penses. This is a theory sponsored by the railroads, and when
fully applied is so vicious in its nature that it enables the com-
panies to defeat any rate established by a state. Had the Min-
nesota rates been twice as high as fixed by the legislature, still
under this revenue theory the companies would have been able to
prove them confiscatory.
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With the revenue theory applied in the manner urged by the
companies, the state plays a game with the cards stacked, or tries
a law suit with the jury packed. To illustrate the viciousness of
the revenue theory, let me assume that the entire revenue of one
railroad for one year in Nebraska is $1oo,ooo; of that amount
$2o,ooo represents the earnings on the state business and $8o,ooo
the earnings on the interstate business. I also assume that the
entire operating expenses amount to $8o,ooo. Now, the revenue
theory, when applied, apportions the operating expenses accord-
ing to the earnings of state and interstate business. It then fol-
lows that $20,000 of state revenue is 1-5 of the total $1oo,ooo
earnings and $8o,ooo interstate is 4-5 thereof. Now, under the
theory, in order to get the amount of operating expenses to be
charged to the state business it is necessary to take 1-5 of, the
total operating expenses, to wit, $8o,ooo, which is $16,ooo, and
4-5 thereof, or $64,000, represents the interstate. The fallacy
inherent in this method is strikingly apparent, because the fac-
tors are unequal, the state rates being much higher than the in-
terstate rates.
The vice of the revenue theory is easily perceived when the
state rates are increased so as to permit a greater revenue there-
from.
Referring to the illustration above, let me double the state rates
so that the revenue therefrom becomes $4o,ooo instead of $2o,ooo,
and let the interstate rates and the revenue therefrom remain the
same. Then I have a total revenue amounting to $120,ooo. Now,
I apportion the operating expenses according to the revenue
theory. Forty thousand dollars is one-third of the total and
$8o,ooo, the interstate revenue, is two-thirds. One-third of the
operating expenses is $26,666.66, and two-thirds is $53,333.33, the
amount of expenses assigned to the interstate business. Observe
that in the first instance the amount of expenses assigned to the
interstate business was $64,000, whereas now it is only $53,333-33.
The interstate business has gained the neat little sum of
$io,666.66, the difference between the two. This is accomplished
without changing any of the figures in the original illustration,
except to double the state rates and thereby secure a larger state
revenue. So, if the state rates are multiplied by four, the gain
to the interstate becomes more astounding.
This is the "revenue theory," which it is declared "appeals more
persuasively to the reason and is the more just and equitable." I
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can not understand how it appeals to the reason of any man. If
it is to be characterized as "just and equitable," then I do not
understand the meaning of those words when used in that sense.
No, this theory does not appeal to the reason. Reason abhors it.
Justice and equity condemn it. I have heard of shell games and
faro tables, and gaming devices designed to catch their victims
coming and going, but I never learned of one which is any more
certain of its victim than the "revenue theory" when it is used to
its full extent as the basis for establishing a state rate reduction
act confiscatory. It will destroy any legislative-made rate. There
is no escape, because it is a device which steals away the earnings
produced by the state rate and appropriates them to the benefit
of the interstate rate.
Instead of characterizing this "revenue theory" as just, equit-
able, and reasonable, and declaring it the proper method by which
to apportion operating expenses as contended for by the railroad
companies, I say it is a cold-blooded confidence game, vicious and
criminal in its effect upon a people already too long outraged
by extortionate railroad rates.
The railroads in Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma and Minnesota
have successfully resorted to this device. The Circuit Court of
Appeals somewhat reluctantly has approved in part this so-called
theory, and uses it as a justification for declaring state rates con-
fiscatory and in striking down state acts designed to give the peo-
ple relief. Is it any wonder that the corporation press from coast
to coast hails this decision as "a clear victory for the railroads ?"
I can not believe that these courts comprehend the results of the
revenue theory or realize the disastrous consequences which will
inevitably follow its adoption. If they did, this theory would re-
ceive their condemnation rather than their approval.
In the Minnesota case the Court assumes that the rates, both
passenger and freight, fixed by the railroads prior to the Minne-
sota reductions, were lawful rates because the companies had filed
their schedules with the interstate commerce commission. The
companies have been carrying passengers over this same territory
for a third of a century at three cents per mile. During that time
the improvement in facilities and equipment have enabled them
to lessen the corresponding operating expcnses, and in the mean-
while this territory has quadrupled in population. If those rates
fixed by the companies thirty years ago were compensatory, what
must they now be under present conditions?
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This plea of railroad confiscation is a fiction. It has no basis
in- fact; it never had. No man is able to call to mind a single
illustration of railroad property subjected to anything approach-
ing confiscation. The history of this Union does not afford a
single instance of this dire calamity. It belongs to the domain of
the imagination. When the property of a railroad company a half
mile in length has suffered anything approximating confiscation,
it will be time to treat this contention seriously. No good citizen
wants to confiscate or even injure the property of an6ther. I do
not stand for any policy that will deprive the railroads of reason-
able returns upon their investments. This they should have, no
more, no less. All I ask is that the method adopted in determin-
ing this question shall be fair and just as between the railroads
and the people. As the law officer of this state, I protest against
the method which some of the Federal Courts have in part ap-
proved. It is so palpably unjust and inequitable that I shall con-
demn and fight it to the end.
Grant G. llartin.
